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In his paper “The challenge of brain death for the sanctity of life ethic”, Peter Singer advocates two options for 
dealing with death criteria in a way that is compatible with efficient organ transplantation policy. He suggests that 
we should either (a) redefine death as cortical death or (b) go back to the old cardiopulmonary criterion and scrap 
the Dead Donor Rule. We welcome Singer’s line of argument but raise some concerns about the practicability of the 
two alternatives advocated by him. We propose adding a third alternative that also – as the two previous alternatives 
– preserves and extends the possibility of organ transplantation without using anyone without their consent. Namely, 
we would like to draw readers’ attention to a proposal by Robert Veatch, formulated 42 years ago in his 1976 book 
“Death, dying, and the biological revolution” and developed further in his later publications. Veatch argues for a 
conscience clause for the definition of death that would permit people to pick from a reasonable range of definitional 
options. This autonomy-based option, we believe, is more likely to be practicable than the two options advocated by 
Singer. Furthermore, we present data from a study with Lithuanian participants that suggest that there is quite 
pronounced variation of preferences concerning death determination. 
 




In his paper “The Challenge of Brain Death for the Sanctity of Life Ethic”, Peter Singer presents 
– in his usual clear and straightforward manner – an updated version of the views he defended 
more than twenty years ago in his bold book Rethinking life and death (Singer, 1995). Although 
the claims Singer defends are the same, he has updated his exposition by adding some recent 
cases and by utilizing arguments and conceptions that were not around at the time the book was 
published. The main thrust of Singer’s argument is that provided that the whole brain death 
criterion of death is philosophically indefensible and provided that it is important to have an 
efficient organ transplantation policy we should either (a) redefine death as irreversible loss of 
consciousness or alternatively (b) go back to the good old cardiopulmonary criterion and scrap 
the Dead Donor Rule (DDR), i.e., we need to allow taking organs from people who have 
irreversibly lost consciousness and have agreed to donate organs in such a condition. We agree 
with Singer’s objections to the whole-brain death criterion. We think, however, that Singer’s 
conclusion neither covers all available options nor is practicable. 
Let us, first, clarify why we think that Singer’s position is impracticable. No doubt, Singer 
himself is aware of that. After presenting his arguments against DDR, Singer admits that “the 
most troubling objection” against his position is a “practical one: no matter how logically 
compelling the proposal may be, it is so out of touch with political reality that it stands no chance 
of success” (Singer, 2018, p. 163).
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of Singer’s dilemma as the so-called higher brain criterion of death seems to be as controversial
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as rejection of DDR. Its acceptance – at least in McMahan’s version that Singer uses in his paper 
– relies on the claim that we essentially are entities with the capacity of consciousness, i.e., 
minds and not organisms (McMahan, 2012, p. 295).
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 Therefore, we cease to exist as soon as we 
irreversibly lose the capacity for consciousness and the fact that our organism still functions, i.e., 
is still alive, is not relevant as far as our death is concerned. But these are highly controversial 




Before we move forward, it is interesting to note, that, while formulated as a disjunction, 
Singer’s conclusion most probably might appeal to the same arguably narrow demographic. The 
reason for that is quite simple. Suppose you agree (with McMahan and others) that death is 
irreversible loss of consciousness or in other words, you accept the claim (a) in Singer’s 
conclusion. What would you say about the disjunct (b)? Now, if you think that you are dead as 
soon as you have irreversibly lost consciousness and you have agreed to donate your organs after 
death, then it turns out that you might accept (b) as well, because (b) states that it is acceptable to 
harvest organs before cardiopulmonary death. In this case, exactly this happens if organs are 
harvested after your consciousness is irreversibly lost and you have already agreed to that under 
(a). Further, after your vital organs are removed you will be dead according to the 
cardiopulmonary criterion of death which is the criterion of death in (b). And the same move 
might work in the opposite direction as well. Suppose you believe that you are dead only when 
your heart stops beating and breathing stops and you also think, that it is acceptable to harvest 
your organs as soon as irreversible loss of consciousness is diagnosed. What would you think 
about option (a)? It seems that after giving it some thought you wouldn’t find anything wrong 
with (a). Of course, according to our hypothesis, you don’t believe that irreversible loss of 
consciousness means death, but as soon as you agree that your vital organs can be harvested 
when you are in this condition, what difference does it make? Besides, as soon as your organs 
are taken you will be dead according to the criterion which you believe to be right. To 
summarize, if you agree to (a) then you most probably will not object to (b) and vice versa. In 
other words, there seems to be no substantial disagreement between holders of either position. 
Singer himself admits that both views (a) and (b) have “the same practical outcome” (Singer, 
2018, p. 163). Our point is that, unfortunately for Singer, it seems that both views most probably 
will appeal to the same – arguably narrow – population. 
Now, what are our options if brain death criterion is indefensible and Singer’s proposal 
impracticable? We believe that there are no scientific facts that would dissolve disagreements 
between those who hold different beliefs about death. The differences between those who, for 
example, hold a conception of whole brain death and those who embrace higher brain criterion 
are metaphysical and moral rather than scientific. If that is the case, then there are no good 
reasons to expect a wide consensus on the issue and the only viable option is to embrace 
pluralism, i.e., the view that reasonable people may have different conceptions of what does it 
mean to be dead. Pluralism about this issue has been proposed by several authors (e.g. Miles, 
1999, Engelhardt, 1999), however from our point of view the most elaborate and strongest 
formulation is that of Robert Veatch and Lainie Ross (Veatch & Ross, 2016).
6
 We believe that a 
                                                          
4
 A similar version of higher brain criterion is defended by W. Glannon (2007, pp. 156–170). 
5
 See e.g., DeGrazia (2005, pp. 124–141). 
6
 The position was originally developed by R. Veatch (see Veatch, 1976; Veatch, 1999). Chapter 6 in Veatch & Ross 
(2016) is an updated version of Veatch (1999). For this reason, further in the text this view will be associated mostly 




view along the lines defended by Veatch and Ross can attain the aim that Singer is after in his 
paper (i.e., it is compatible with efficient organ transplantation policy) without the shortcomings 
of Singer’s proposal as it stands a better chance to be accepted as a policy.  
Veatch has been famous for his defense of the higher brain criterion of death.
7
 However, he is 
well aware that whatever the philosophical merits of higher brain conception of death, one 
cannot reasonably expect that it will be widely accepted view on death in the current society. But 
the same applies to both alternatives defended by various authors in biomedical literature – 
whole-brain death and cardiopulmonary death. Although the whole-brain criterion of death is 
legally supported in many countries around the world, there are a considerable number of people 
who still don’t share it. Either because they (together with, for example, orthodox Jews or 
Shintoists in Japan) incline towards the cardiopulmonary conception of death or because as 
Veatch, McMahan and others they think that the higher brain conception of death is a 
conceptually more plausible candidate for the role. Provided that there are no good reasons to 
expect that these different groups will reach a consensus on the issue, the only practicable 
solution, according to Veatch, is to tolerate the differences and to allow different groups to act on 
their opinions. Therefore, Veatch suggests that persons while competent should be free within 
reason to choose the criteria under which they should be considered dead. As there is an 
indefinite number of theoretically possible conceptions of death, Veatch argues that people 
should be offered to choose from the three plausible accounts mentioned above, i.e., 
cardiopulmonary, whole-brain and higher brain. Further, since for different reasons not everyone 
will make an explicit choice among the offered concepts of death, there must be a default 
position on death, so that is clear for, e.g., doctors how to proceed in such cases. Veatch proposes 
that the best candidate for that role is the whole-brain conception. Moreover, in some cases 
where patients have not made their view on death clear while competent, the decision within 
certain limits should be made by the next of kin as it is already done in other similar situations.  
The same or essentially similar view has been endorsed by other authors as well. For example, 
individual choice about the definition of death has been defended by Alireza Bagheri (Bagheri, 
2007). Bagheri examines the then current Japanese law that in certain situations allow patients to 
choose between cardiopulmonary and whole-brain death, but this only is permitted for potential 
organ donors and besides, the choice must be accepted by the members of a family. Bagheri 
endorses Veatch’s view and stresses the importance of respect for the patient’s autonomy. 
Although Bagheri considers only two conceptions of death in the paper (cardiopulmonary and 
whole-brain) he is open to other candidates as well.
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 A similar position has also been advanced 
by Sass (Sass, 1992). Like Veatch, he also argues that patients should be able to make the choice 
between the three conceptions of death with whole-brain death as the default view. But he differs 
in his view on proxy decision making. According to Sass, proxy decision making about the 
conception of death should be accepted only in cases of parents deciding about their minor 
children. Linda Emanuel in her 1995 paper (Emanuel, 1995) argues for what she calls the 
asymptotic model of death that recommends a bounded zone approach to life cessation. Emanuel 
rejects the traditional model according to which life and death are poles in binary opposition. 
This model, she thinks, should be modified. Emanuel suggests that we should think about death 
as a gradual process that can be depicted more like an asymptotic curve. Accordingly, each of the 
three mentioned conceptions of death should be considered as three different points on this 
curve. The continuum between irreversible loss of consciousness and irreversible cessation of 
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pulmonary and cardiac function constitutes what Emanuel calls the zone of life cessation 
(Emanuel, 1995, p. 32). Emanuel points out that no position within the zone can lay claim to 
absolute correctness. Therefore, although starting from different conceptual considerations her 
conclusion is practically the same as the one proposed by Veatch, i.e., that within the provided 
limits we should tolerate personal differences on this issue. 
Do we have evidence that such personal differences are widespread? It is important to study 
public attitudes to learn about this. In general, there seems to be much public misunderstanding 
of the medical facts as well as legal realities. As indicated in a recent literature review, “the 
existing data on public attitudes regarding brain death and organ transplantation reflect 
substantial public confusion” (Shah et al., 2015, p. 291). However, there seems to be quite 
consistent public support for DDR (see DuBois and Anderson 2006 for a review), even though 
some studies have registered divergences from the rule (Nair-Collins et al., 2014). Another 
important tendency registered in the literature is that it seems that in research conducted in Japan 
and China (see Yang & Miller 2015, p. 216 for a brief overview) a strongly pronounced 
preference for the cardiopulmonary understanding of death can be observed. However, to the 
best of our knowledge, there are no studies that allow study participants to choose their 
preference from a wide set of answers that refer to different stages in the process of dying. In 
order to provide some preliminary data on these issues we’ve conducted a study. 
 
Study 
Participants. 160 Lithuanian participants completed an online survey (63% females, 33% males, 
3% chose ‘other / prefer not to answer’, 1% did not indicate their answer; mean age: 30.7; age 
SD = 8.26; age range 18–60, 3% did not indicate their answer). 
Materials and procedure. After providing consent, participants read the following possible 
description of the process of dying, divided into stages: 
(1) The patient had a fever and headaches for 3 days. The patient cannot tolerate bright 
light or noises. The patient is nauseated, and when he moves too fast he has vertigo. The 
doctor stuck a needle into the patient’s back to get some of the fluid in his brain and the 
results came back indicating inflammation. The doctor diagnosed meningitis. 
(2) The patient has been in hospital for 3 days. First, in the Neurology unit, but after a 
day he was transferred to the Intensive care unit. Patient’s memories of the recent past are 
fragmented, he has intense hallucinations. Medication is used to calm him down. In the 
ICU he is asleep most of the time. When he opens his eyes he cannot recognize the 
relatives. Sometimes when awake he mumbles random words or screams. 
(3) The patient’s state deteriorated rapidly. His brain herniated. Due to that the 
cerebral cortex of the brain stopped functioning. The patient is still breathing on his own 
and his heart is beating, but he cannot feel anything or make himself move. 
Consciousness has been irrevocably lost. The patient does not react to any attempts to 
talk to him. However, the patient responds to some stimuli: when the neurologist poured 
some ice-cold water into the patient’s ears and looked for his eyes to move, they did 
move. The patient has been in this state for two weeks. 
(4) The patient’s brain stopped functioning. The patient is intubated and breathing is 
done by mechanical lung ventilator. If removed from it, the patient would not be able to 
breath. The heart is beating, but medication is needed to sustain it. The patient does not 




very basic reflexes remain: when the neurologist hits the knee with a little rubber 
hammer, the leg moves. The patient has been in this state for two weeks. 
(5) The patient’s heart stopped and the patient was disconnected from the ventilator. 
The patient is not breathing; the body temperature starts to drop below 36
0
C. The skin is 
becoming cold and grey. The patient is not responsive to any stimuli whatsoever. 
(6) After a day, the body is cold and stiff. The temperature is the same as room 
temperature. The blood in blood vessels has pooled in the lower parts of the body due to 
gravity. The abdomen is distended because guts are starting to decay due to bacteria 
there.  
Stage 3 was designed to reflect the higher brain criterion of death, Stage 4 – whole-brain 
death, Stage 5 – cardiopulmonary criterion. This 6-stage description was always available for 
participants at the bottom of each page with questions. 
On the next page some additional background information was provided in order to make the 
study task more intelligible to the participants: 
In different countries of the world, different criteria for the determination of death are used. 
For example, in some countries, death is declared after full brain death, while in others – when 
the heart no longer beats. In some countries, people have the right to choose what criterion will 
be applied to them or to their relatives. 
The next two pages contained questions on preferences for determining death. One 
concerning the self and the other concerning a close relative. The order of presentation of these 
two questions was randomized and participants were not allowed to come back to the previous 
page to change their responses. 
Question about the self read as follows: 
Try to think about your own preferences concerning your death. Suppose that you also 
can end up in a situation that resembles the one described. (If you want to refresh your 
memory, description of the process of dying is repeated at the bottom of this page.) 
Please indicate the stage of the process of dying at which you would prefer your own 
death to be stated and all medical procedures stopped. 
While the question about relatives read: 
Try to think about your preferences concerning the death of your closest relatives. 
Suppose that a close relative of yours can end up in a situation that resembles the one 
described. (If you want to refresh your memory, description of the process of dying is 
repeated at the bottom of this page.) Please indicate the stage of the process of dying at 
which you would prefer the death of your relative to be stated and all medical procedures 
stopped. 
For both questions, participants had to choose the stage as numbered in the description of the 
process of dying. 
After answering questions about death determination, some additional background was 
provided on the next page concerning organ procurement for donation. 
The time at which death is determined is also very important in the context of organ 
donation, since organs are suitable for transplantation only when they are not damaged. 
Most frequently, organs are procured for donation after the complete death of the brain 
(Stage 4 in the description of the process of dying), but sometimes a medical professional 
wait till the heart stops beating (Stage 5), but in such a case it is necessary to procure the 




The next two pages contained questions on preferences for organ procurement. One 
concerning the self and the other concerning a close relative. The order of presentation of these 
two questions was randomized and participants were not allowed to come back to the previous 
page to change their responses. 
The question about the self read: 
Try to think about your own preferences concerning organ donation. Suppose that you 
also can end up in a situation that resembles the one described. (If you want to refresh 
your memory, description of the process of dying is repeated at the bottom of this page.) 
Please indicate the stage of the process of dying at which you would prefer your organs to 
be procured for transplantation. 
While the question about the relative read: 
Suppose that a close relative of yours can end up in a situation that resembles the one 
described. (If you want to refresh your memory, description of the process of dying is 
repeated at the bottom of this page.) Please also suppose that your close relative 
expressed a wish to become an organ donor after they die. Please indicate the stage of the 
process of dying at which you would prefer the organs of your close relative to be 
procured for transplantation. 
For both questions, participants had to choose a stage as numbered in the description of the 
process of dying. They were also allowed to choose an additional option; “I would not agree to 
organ donation in such case”. Participants then provided information on their gender and age and 
were thanked for participation. 
Results. Since our measures asked to indicate the stages in the process of dying presented in a 
temporal order, we treat our data as answers on ordinal scale, and thus run non-parametric tests. 
Death determination, the main analysis. The Mann-Whitney U test was performed in order 
to test for order effects. No differences in ranks were observed in either responses to the first 
person scenario (U = 3148.0, p = .855, r = .01) or the scenario about the relative (U = 2964.5, p = 
.388, r = .07). Thus, all participants were pooled for related samples analysis. 
 
Preferences are displayed in Table 1: 
 
 First-person Relative 
Stages n % n % 
1 0 0 % 0 0 % 
2 4 2.5 % 0 0 % 
3 48 30.0%  22 13.8%  
4 72 45.0%  76 47.5%  
5 30 18.8%  53 33.1%  
6 6 3.8 % 9 5.6 % 
 
Table 1. Preferences of participants concerning stages of the dying process in which their 
death and the death of their relatives should be stated (N=160). n indicates the number of 
participants choosing a given stage and % indicates the percent of participants choosing a given 
stage. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding, 
 
In both cases, the top 3 most frequently chosen stages were 3, 4, and 5, with 4 being the most 




Looking in more detail, out of 160 participants, 55 (34%) chose the later stage for determining 
a relative’s death than their own death while only 3 (2%) chose the earlier stage for themselves. 
The remaining 102 (64%) preferred the same stage for both cases. A Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test 
indicated that participants were more often willing to choose a later stage for relatives than for 
themselves, Z = 6.29, p < .001, PSdep = .34. Here and later in the paper we use the probability of 
superiority estimation for dependent groups (PSdep) as a measure of effect size for Wilcoxon 
Signed-ranks tests (as recommended by Grissom & Kim, 2014, pp. 114–115). PSdep = .34 means 
that there is a 34% probability that within a randomly sampled pair of responses, the score for the 
relative will be higher than the score for self. 
Additional analyses. For subsequent analyses that involve decisions concerning 
transplantation, 6 participants were removed since they chose “I would not agree to organ 
donation in such a case” as an answer to at least one transplantation question (2 were opposed in 
first-person case; 2 – in the relative’s case; 2 – in both). The reason for their exclusion is that 
leaving them in would not allow answers to be treated as choices on an ordinal scale anymore. 
Remaining participants (N=154) exhibit the following pattern (Table 2): 
 
 Death determination Organ removal for transplantation 
 First-person Relative First-person Relative 
Stages n % n % n % n % 
1 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 % 
2 4 2.6 % 0 0 % 3 1.9 % 0 0 % 
3 47 30.5%  22 14.3 % 37 24.0%  20 13.0%  
4 70 45.5%  73 47.4 % 93 60.4%  99 64.3%  
5 27 17.5%  51 33.1 % 20 13.0%  34 22.1%  
6 6 3.9 % 8 5.2 % 1 0.6 % 1 0.6 % 
 
Table 2. Preferences of participants concerning stages of the dying process in which their 
death and the death of their relatives should be stated and in which theirs and their relatives’ 
organs can be taken for transplantation (N=154). n indicates the number of participants choosing 
a given stage and % indicates the percent of participants choosing a given stage. Percentages 
may not add up to 100 due to rounding, 
 
In all four cases, the top 3 most frequently chosen stages were 3, 4, and 5, with 4 (full-brain 
death) being the most frequent (45,5% in first-person question, 47.4 % in the relative’s question, 
60.4 % in transplantation first-person case and 64.3% in transplantation relative case). 
Death determination. Out of 154 participants, 53 (34%) chose the later stage for determining 
the relative’s death than their own death while only 2 (1%) chose the later stage for themselves 
than for their relatives. The remaining 99 (64%) preferred the same stage for both cases. A 
Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test indicated that participants were more often willing to choose a later 
stage for relatives than for themselves, Z = 6.31, p < .001, PSdep = .34. Results are nearly 
identical to those achieved in the full sample before 6 participants were removed. 
Transplantation. Out of 154 participants, 37 (24%) chose a later stage for harvesting a 
relative’s organs than their own while only 2 (1%) chose a later stage for themselves. The 
remaining 115 (75%) preferred the same stage for both cases. A Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test 
indicated that participants were more often willing to choose a later stage for relatives than for 




First-person case. Out of 154 participants, 19 (12%) chose a later stage for harvesting their 
organs than for determining their death while 21 (14%) chose an earlier stage for harvesting their 
organs than for determining their death. The remaining 114 (74%) preferred the same stage for 
both cases. A Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test indicated that there was no difference in first-person 
cases between stages preferred for death determination and for organ procurement, Z = .73, p = 
.464, PSdep = .14. 
Relative case. Out of 154 participants, 12 (8%) chose a later stage for harvesting the organs of 
the relative than for determining the death of the relative. 33 (21%) chose an earlier stage for 
organ procurement than for determining their death. The remaining 109 (71%) preferred the 
same stage for both cases. A Wilcoxon Signed-ranks test indicated that there was a difference: in 
the relative’s case, death determination tended to be later than organ procurement, Z = 3.46, p < 
.001, PSdep = .21. 
Discussion. In the study, participants tended to choose an earlier stage in the process of dying 
for determining their own death than for determining the death of their relative. This has 
potential implications for situations in which relatives are entrusted with making a decision 
concerning which criterion is to be applied: relatives may be inclined to choose a later stage for 
determining their death than the patient herself would be inclined, would she be able to make 
such a decision. This can be mitigated by encouraging people to write advance directives and 
putting more weight on them. 
The same pattern was observed concerning the time at which organs are procured for 
transplantation. Participants tended to choose an earlier stage for themselves than for their 
relatives. This can also raise a similar concern in which relatives push for a later stage for organ 
procurement from their dying/dead relative. 
Concerning the dead donor rule, the results are largely consistent with the rule: the vast 
majority prefers organs to be taken at the same stage at which death is declared or at a later stage. 
However, there was also a minority who exhibited a different pattern for themselves (14% of 
participants chose earlier stage for procurement of organs than for determining death) and also 
for the relatives (21%). 
Looking at preferences for determining death, all three candidate criteria seem to have some 
support in our sample. The vast majority chose one of the three options that were designed to 
mimic death determination criteria familiar from the literature. This was true both for preferences 
concerning determination of their own death and the death of their relatives. Stage 4 (whole-
brain death) was the most popular option for self (45%) and for relatives (47,5%), but Stage 3 
(higher-brain death; 30% for self and 13,8% for relatives) and Stage 4 (cardiopulmonary death; 
18,8% for self and 33,1% for relatives) were also popular. 
The latter result supports the idea of widening the set of criteria available for choice: higher-
brain death should also be in the choice-set, as argued for by Veatch but not Bagheri. 
The limitations of the present study include that only one potential description of the dying 
process was used. Also, a relatively small sample of online participants does not allow 
generalization to the whole Lithuanian population. However, it provides some evidence that 
there is a plurality of preferences. Moreover, the results are consistent with a much larger study 
we conducted with Latvian participants (Neiders & Dranseika, unpublished manuscript). 
 
Conclusions 
Peter Singer in his paper argues that in order to have an efficient transplantation policy we 




of death as irreversible loss of cardiopulmonary function in combination with scrapping the dead 
donor rule. In our commentary we have argued that this conclusion is neither practicable nor 
necessary. We think that there is a better option available – the pluralistic approach defended in 
literature by Veatch and other authors. According to his view, we must admit that reasonable 
people have different views on how death should be determined and therefore there must be a 
possibility for them to make their own decision about the matter as long as nobody else is 
harmed. This solution might resolve many conflicts and enforce the value of autonomy. 
Our empirical data give preliminary evidence that there is a wide variety of opinions 
concerning death determination criteria. This provides some support for the claim the policy 
recommended by Veatch will be able to accommodate the plurality of preferences that exists in 
the society. This may help the policy to achieve acceptance. Besides, our data show that the three 
conceptions of death that are widely discussed in bioethics literature and suggested by Veatch as 
candidates for people to choose from are not entirely arbitrary. In addition, since whole brain 
criterion was the most frequently chosen answer, this would provide some prima facie evidence 
that – if a default option is needed – this criterion can be used as the default. Also our data 
provides some support for the Dead Donor Rule. Finally, our study provides some evidence that 
people have a tendency to make a different judgment about the death of their close relatives than 
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